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The article further develops Kolmogorov's algorithmic omplexity theory. The 
definition of randomness is modified to satisfy strong invariance properties (conser- 
vation inequalities). This allows definitions of concepts such as mutual information 
in individual infinite sequences. Applications to several areas, like probability 
theory, theory of algorithms, intuitionistic logic are considered. These theories are 
simplified substantially with the postulate that the objects they consider are 
independent of (have small mutual information with) any sequence specified by a 
mathematical  property. © 1984 Academic Press, Inc. 
I. ALGORITHMIC  INFORMATION 
O. Initial Remarks 
O. 1. Introduction 
Recursive function theory provides analogs of many concepts of classical 
analysis by requiring countable sets considered to be recursively enumerable 
(r.e.). The analogy is quite close: intrinsically nonalgorithmic methods are 
rare in mathematics. Moreover, the general theory of algorithms is very 
similar to descriptive set theory. There is, however, an important exception in 
the existence of universal algorithms. The set of all (countable) sets of 
integers is uncountable while the set of r.e. sets is r.e. This rather abstract 
difference opens, however, new analytical possibilities having no analogies in 
"nonalgorithmic" analysis. Let us illustrate this with a simple but important 
example. 
Let l~ c ~R ~ be the space of all absolutely summable real sequences: p C l~, 
iff ~ ]p(x)] < c~. Its recursive analog It c l 1 consists of elements of l I whose 
subgraph {(r, x) :p(x)  > r E 8} is r.e. It is known in calculus that no element 
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is maximal in l I within a constant factor: Yp C l I 3q E l I lim q(x)/p(x) = ~.  
In contrast o this ( has an "absorbing" element m (a universal measure) 
such that 
Vq E l 1 sup(q(x)/m(x) ) < oo. Here m(x) = ~ ri(x)/2i 2, 
where {ri} is an r.e. family of all nonnegative r.e. sequences with the sum 
bounded by 1. 
Complexity K(x)=-  [ln m(x)] is closely related to the length of a 
shortest program generating x in an optimal language discovered in 
(Kolmogorov, 1965; Solomonoff, 1964). Their work originated an invariant 
approach to information theory, foundations of probability theory, inductive 
inference, and a number of other areas. Any function of integers, invariant 
with respect o all recursive transformations, i  a constant. However K is 
approximately invariant, i.e., max(K(~0(x))- K(x)) < ~ for any recursive ~o. 
Concepts like mutual information I(x :y) = K(x) + K(y) - K(x,y) or 
deficiency of randomness (with respect o a measure/~): I lng(x) l -  K(x) also 
have attractive invariance properties uitable for many applications. These 
ideas of algorithmic information theory, are based on analytical features 
arising in the recursive analogs of some spaces of classical analysis, as in the 
above example. 
We hope to introduce the reader to the general spirit of the theory by 
choosing a particular problem and developing the concepts needed for its 
solution. The problem used for organizing this work is to formalize, justify, 
and apply the following physical principle: 
Let R be the reference to a physical process generating sequence a R . Let P 
be a (nonrecursive) mathematical property specifying sequence fl~. The 
lengths of R and P may be negligible compared to the informational content 
of a R and fie ; e.g., R may be bibliographical reference to a book a R and P(fl) 
may be "fl is the first sequence which cannot be generated by a program of 
< 101° bits." Then it is predicted: 
INDEPENDENCE POSTULATE. The sequences aR and fie are independent, 
i.e., I(a R :fie) < [R[ + IPI. 
A special case of a=f l  gives a "finitary Church's thesis": Every 
"physically existing" sequence must be "finitary recursive," i.e., have approx- 
imately as short recursive xpression as any of its nonrecursive ones. For a 
more typical example, fl might be specified as "the set of all true arithmetical 
assertions of <10 l° symbols" and a might be the library of all mathematical 
publications. To implement these ideas a function I: N ~× nq n~ ~ + must be 
defined satisfying various intuitive and technical requirements. 
In Part II the random sequences, the intuitionistic free-choice sequences, 
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and the representatives of "regular" Turing degrees, respectively, are 
considered as a. In each of these three cases a formalization of the Indepen- 
dence Postulate is shown to simplify radically the corresponding theories. 
0.2. Brief References 
The following remarks do not present he history of the area and mainly 
concern the works directly used here. Algorithmic information theory 
originated with the discovery of universal coding and a recursively invariant 
approach to the concepts of complexity, information, randomness, and a 
priori probability (Kolmogorov, 1965; Solomonoff, 1964). Uspekhi Mat. 
Nauk announced Kolmogorov's talks on this subject in 1961 and following 
years. Some of Solomonoff's ideas were mentioned in (Minsky, 1962) and 
preprints. See also (Markov, 1964) and (Chaitin, 1966, 1969). 
Despite the depth of the main idea, the technical expression of basic quan- 
tities was not accurate. Many important relationships hold only with an error 
such as the logarithm of complexity. This error rate is negligible in 
comparison to complexity itself, but can exceed such differences as mutual 
information, deficiency of randomness, etc. The errors distorted the picture 
and hindered the development of a transparent theory. The concept of 
randomness was improved in (Martin-Lof, 1966) for the case of recursive 
measures. It was not, however, extendible to other important cases nor 
expressible in terms of a measure-independent no ion like complexity. Very 
interesting studies of randomness were made in (Schnorr). Some of its ideas 
proposed independently of (Zvonkin and Levin, 1970) are related to 
Propositions 4 and 5 below. 
The problem of giving a precise expression for information proved to be 
more difficult. The first nontrivial results were obtained by Kolmogorov and 
Levin in 1967. The initial definition of l(x :y) from (Kolmogorov, 1965) was 
asymmetric and not monotone over y (with respect to projection 
(Yl,YE)-'Yl). In (Kolmogorov, 1968; Zvonkin and Levin, 1970) this 
definition was demonstrated to coincide, within the logarithm of complexity, 
with a symmetric expression, and to be therefore approximately monotone 
over both arguments. 
In (Zvonkin and Levin, 1970) the universal measure was introduced. Its 
logarithm (equal to the length of the shortest self-delimiting (or prefix) code) 
turned out to be a more satisfactory complexity measure on N than the 
original proposal from (Kolmogorov, 1965). It allowed improvement of the 
definitions of randomness (Levin, 1973a) and information (Levin, 1974). 
The new definition of information was monotonic within an additive constant 
(rather than logarithm) and extendible to the case of infinite sequences. This 
work is related to subtle results of (Gacs, 1974) concerning the differences 
between the symmetric and asymmetric expressions for information. A 
number of results of (Kolmogorov, 1968; Levin, 1970, 1973, 1974; Gacs, 
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1974) were also found independently in (Chaitin, 1975). A version of the 
present paper appeared as an MIT technical report MIT/LCS/TR-235 
(1980) and some results were formulated in (Levin, 1970-77). 
0.3. Conventions 
N, Q, ~ are the sets of natural, rational, and real numbers. T + is the 
subset {x: x >/0} of an ordered set T~ {0}, and T is TU  {oo }. The integer 
part of x E 9~ is [xJ. The number m + ((m + n)(m + n + 1)/2) is called the 
pair (m, n) of numbers m, n E N. This enumeration of pairs is bijective on 
nq 2 c ~ 2. Cantor's perfect set is represented in the form O = ~ ~ which has 
simpler (than {0, 1} N) expression for pairs: (a, fl)(i)= (a(i), fl(i)), where a(i), 
fl(i)~ ~ are the ith terms of a and ft. Let Sk= {0, 1,...,k, oo} k and S= 
{.gSk; the length l(x) ofxCS k is k. If aEO or aES  n and k~<n, then 
a k E S~ is the initial k-segment of a with all terms a(i) > k replaced by oo; 
x c a means x = Ctl~x) , I(x) <~ l(a). 
Any property P is identified with the set {x:P(x)} and its characteristic 
function. An open subset of a topological space with natural countable basis 
is called recursively enumerable (r.e.) if it equals the union of an r.e. family 
of basis sets. A real function F on such set is called r.e. if its subgraph, i.e., 
the set {(x, r): r < F(x)} is r.e. It is called reeursive i f F  and --F are r.e. The 
symbols -<, ~, and ~ denote inequality and equality of functions within an 
additive constant; 4,  9, and ~ denote these relations within a constant 
factor. Such operations, as Y~ fi sup f, min fi etc., are assumed taken over the 
values of all variables of the term f, not bounded in the context. 
Conventions for Section 2. Let J -  be the space of continuous functions 
f:  .(2 --* ~ with the norm [[f[[ = sup If(x)[; its countable dense subset J - '  c~Y- 
consists of the functions whose ranges are finite sets of rationals. Let J -  
be the space of lower semicontinuous functions I2 --, ~ and ~ '  be the set of 
positive linear functionals J -~  91. Any p E ~e" represents a measure on 
and p( f )  is the average value of fl Let JU be the set of positive linear 
operators J -~- .  Any A E JC represents a continuous random transfor- 
mation of .O and A ( f )  maps a to the average value o f f  on the image of a. 
We identify a E 12 with the measure g, ( f )=f (a ) ,  and a deterministic 
transformation A: ~ --, .(2 with the operator f--, g, where g(a) =f (A (a)). 
Restricting p E~g to S ~ J -  gives p' :  S~ 9~, such that p'(x) = ~p' (y ) ,  
y C a(x), where a(x) = { y: y ~ x, l(y) = l(x) + 1 } and p is uniquely deter- 
mined by such p'.  Any r.e. measure is recursive. 
Random partial processes generate sequences which may stop after a finite 
number of terms. Their probability distributions atisfy only the inequality 
p(x) >/~/a(y), y E a(x). This leads to the space ~ of semimeasures, i.e., 
positive, uniform, concave functionals /~: J -~  9~, where /~(~r'+) c 5~ + and 
#(pf+g)>/pl~(f) +l~(g) for pC  91 +. o~ is normed by Null = I/~(-1)1 and 
ordered as functions on J -+ .  Any semimeasure equals the infimum of the 
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measures majorizing it. Let ~ be the largest measure not exceeding p. A 
semimeasure/z like a measure can be extended to - J - ,  as ~( f )= inf{p(f'): 
f<~f' E J -}  and to (~+)o, as p( f )=sup{p( f ' ) : f>/ f 'E - J -} .  If f E J - ,  
then p(f)=sup{p(f ' ) : f>~f'  ~J -} .  Random partial transformations are 
represented by positive uniform concave operators A : J '~  W" forming the 
set Y .  By A(p) we mean ~t' E~ such that: t2'(f)=t~(A(f)). All these 
considerations can be justified using the Hahn-Banach theorem and related 
results of functional analysis. 
The proofs are succinct and require slow reading with frequent reference 
to the present section. They are, however, independent; one may skip many 
of them and still understand the others. 
1. Discrete Case 
1.1. Complexity, Randomness, and Information 
Complexity K(x) defined in Subsection 0.1 determines the length of the 
shortest codes of integers x. A prefix algorithm A: {0 ..... k -- 1 }* ~ IN is one 
defined on at most one prefix of any string. Informally, A recognizes the end 
of input with no special mark and rejects any continuation. So it has a truly 
kary input alphabet. The volume Ix[ of x E {0,..., k -  1 }" is In • In k]. 
PROPOSITION 1 (Coding). A prefix algorithm A (the Huffman code) 
exists generating any x E ~ from some input of volume K(x); i.e., 
3A, e Vx 3p (A(p)= x and Ipl = K(x) + c). 
No prefix algorithm A can be better, i.e., YA 3c Vx Yp ((A (p) = x) ~ [p[ >~ 
K(x)  - c). 
It is not known how efficient Proposition 1 is. Is it easy to find (or at least 
to execute) a (generating x) program p of volume [p[ close to [ln/~(x)l, if 
measure/2 E l 1 is computable in polynomial time? 
Proof The set G = {(x, n): n > K(x)} is r.e. Then a recursive bijection 
f: N ~ G exists. Let 2(x, n) = e-"  and /~(t) = Y~{2(f(t')): t' < t}. Then 
/L(oo) = Y~ 2(x, K(x) + i) = ~ e -~¢¢x) Y~ e -t < 1. Let f(t) = (x, n) and p be 
the shortest kary fraction within ~u(t),/~(t + 1)). Then A(p)= x. 
Vice versa, A is defined on at most one prefix of any string, and is exten- 
dible to {0 ..... k--1}N. The uniform measure on {0 ..... k--1}N is 
B({a:aDq})=k -l~q). If K'(x)=min{iqi:A(q)=x} then, obviously, 
e -K'~x) <~B(A-l(x)) < 1 and e -K 'E  ~.  Q.E.D. 
So K(x)measures the minimal information eeded to generate x. This 
makes definition of I(x :y) = K(x) + K(y)  -- K(x, y) more intuitive and also 
agrees with Shannon's idea that the amount of information in an event equals 
the negative logarithm of its probability. Obviously, I(x :y )k  0, because 
mZ(x,y)---- re(x) re(y) is an r.e. measure and thus m2~ m. 
Let us arrive at the expression I(x :y) from another point of view: the 
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concept of randomness. Let g be a recursive measure on N and t: N ~ ~ + be 
an r.e. function with average value p(t) ~< 1. If x C fN appears randomly with 
probability/l(x) one may expect t(x) to be not much larger then average. 
Then [In t(x)] may serve as a randomness test Cu-test) for x. 
Note 1. For any r.e. measure Ft, d(x/~)= [ln(m(x)/p(x))] is the largest 
(within an additive constant)g-test. 
So, d(x/g)~ ] lng(x) l -  K(x) is, in a sense, a universal characteristic of 
"nonrandomness," called the randomness deficiency of x with respect o p. 
Motivations, some history, and the general formulation of the concept of 
randomness are discussed in Chapter 3. 
Let two random variables be independent and have the same distribution 
p. Then their joint distribution is g2(x,y)=l~(X)ll(y ). Suppose a pair 
(X, y)~ IN 2 looks random for probability distribution m z, i.e., d((x, y)/m z) is 
small. This means that (1) x and y look independent and (2) each of them 
looks random for distribution m. But (2) is vacuously true, since all numbers 
look random for the universal distribution m: d(x /m)= 0. 
Therefore, the smallness of d((x,y)/m z) means only that x and y could be 
generated independently of each other. It is natural then to consider 
d((x, y)/m 2) = I(x :y) as the deficiency of independence. This reminds one of 
the theorem of classical probabilistic information theory in which two 
random variables are independent iff they have no mutual information. The 
difference is that the concepts given above are applicable to individual 
objects themselves, and not only to their probability distributions (i.e., 
random variables). 
1.2. Conservation of Independence 
The information I(x :y) has a remarkable invariance; it cannot be 
increased by random or deterministic (recursive) processing of x or y. This is 
natural, since if x contains no information about y then there is little hope to 
find out something about y by processing x. (Torturing an uninformed 
witness cannot give information about the crime!) 
PROPOSITION 2 (Independence Conservation). Let f: N~N be a 
reeursive function, and ~o be an r.e. measure on N. Then 
(1) I ( f (x) :y)<~I(x:y) ,  
(2) f exp(I((x, z) :y)) dq~(z)~ exp(I(x :y)). 
The linear scale (instead of the logarithmic one) strengthens (2) and is 
more natural with linear operator f. Proposition 2 is an elementary version 
of the corollary of Theorem 1 below and also implies independence onser- 
vation in any combination of random and deterministic (recursive) 
processes. This supports the Independence Postulate in Subsection 0.1. 
Proof Lemma 1 (Gacs, 1974). K(x, K(x)),-~ K(x). 
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This elegant lemma has a short proof: let p be a shortest code for x. 
Obviously, both x and K(x )= IPl are computable from p. Therefore, the 
complexity of (x, K(x)) equals I Pl = K(x). 
Let the universal conditional measure be the largest within a constant 
factor r.e. function m(/): N2~ 9t + such that supyY~m(x/y)< ~, and 
K(x/y) = - [in m(x/y)]. 
LEMMA 2. K(x,y) ~ K(x) + K(y/(x, K(x))). 
Let moo(y/x,n)=e"m(x,y). A nondecreasing by k, recursive sequence 
mk(Y/X, n): A k--* (~+ exists, such that moo = sup mk, where A k c N a are 
finite. Let k(x, n) = sup{k: Y~ mk(Y/X, n) <. 1}, and rh(y/x, n) = 
mk(x.,)(y/x, n). Obviously Vx, n Y~ rh(y/x, n) ~< 1 (thus r~(/) ~ m(/)) and 
¥x,n if Y~m(x,y)<.e-", then m~(y/x,n)=rh(y/x,n). Therefore ¥x,n if 
Y~ re(x, y) ~< e-" (and thus re(x) ~ e-n or n > K(x)) then m(y/x, n) 
rh(y/x, n) = mm(y/x, n) = enm(x, y). Thus K(y/x, K(x)) < K(x, y) - K(x). 
It remains to prove that K(y/(x,K(x)))>K(x,y)-K(x), ,~K(x,y)-  
K(x, K(x)). This follows from K(x, y) -< K(y, x, K(x)), K(x) ,-. K(x, K(x)), 
and K(y, t )<:K( t )+ K(y/t). The latter inequality holds since m'(y, t )=  
re(t) m(y/t) is obviously an r.e. measure and then m'(y, t)<> re(y, t). 
Now, K(x, y, z) < K(x, K(X)) + K(y/(x, K(x))) + K(z/(x, K(x))) 
K(x,y) + K(x, z)--  K(x), since K(y, z/t)-< K(y/t) + K(z/t). Therefore 
I((z, x ) :y )> I(x :y) and (1) follows by noting that I(z :y )~ I((z, x ) :y )  for 
x =A(z), since z and (z,A(z)) are computable from each other. 
To prove (2) we need to show that m(x,y)/(m(x)m(y))~ f(m(x,y,z)/ 
(m(y) m(x, z))) dq~(z), or f(m(x, y, z)/m(x, z)) dm(z) ~ m(x, y)/m(x), since 
m(z)~p(z) .  Rewrite it: ~zm(z)m(x,y,z)/m(x,z)~m(x,y)/m(x) or 
~z m(z) m(x) m(x, y, z)/m(x, z) ~ m(x, y). The latter is obvious since 
m(z) m(x) ~ m(x, z) and )Z m(x, y, z) ~ m(x, y). Q.E.D. 
1.3. Time of Computation 
The speed of generating various r.e. sets is, as a rule, ignored in this work. 
Now we touch this question briefly. Let tamp) mean the running time of A (p). 
If A is the optimal algorithm from Proposition 1 and R (p) is (A (p), ] p [) then 
Vx 3p:R(p)= (x,K(x)). Exhaustive search for such p takes exponential 
time, even when R(p) is fast. Let us give a fastest algorithm (storage 
modification machine) finding p. 
Let KtB(x/y)=min{(lpl+lntB~p.y)):B(p,y)=x }, where p is a string 
without termination mark: the algorithm B receives, upon request, the digits 
o fp  in order until p is ended; in case of further requests B gets no reply and 
gives no output. Ktn(x)=Kt~(x/O). Analogously to Proposition 1, an 
optimal B exists such that Kt n is minimal within an additive constant, and 
Kt B is denoted by Kt. There exists an algorithm G(n, y) generating the list 
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{x:Kt(x/y)= n} in time e"; and within a constant factor, Kt is a minimal 
function with this property. (The asymptotically minimal one is kt(x)= 
min{Kt(a): x E a c N}). Let R be some function computable in polynomial 
time. A problem of finding q E R-~(s) (when it exists) is called a search 
problem. An NP-problem is to find whether (short) such a q exists. W.l.o.g., 
t R can be made linear by "padding" q with zeros. Searching through all q in 
the order of increasing Kt(q/s) (rather than Iql) gives a fastest (within a 
constant factor) algorithm for solving any search problem (see Levin, 1973a; 
related ideas were also expressed by L. Adleman). 
Functions like Kt are of a particular interest for the case of randomized 
algorithms. For f: N~ + let e(f) be the expected value of 
1/(tB~,~ ) +f(B(a))), where a is the random variable and, like above, B is the 
optimal algorithm. Let C(f)= [--ln c(f)].  For F c N, C(F) means C(f), 
where f(x)= 0, if x EF, else f(x)= m. The above algorithm G(n,y), 
generates numbers x CFcN from random y=a in time <e n with 
probability p > 1 - e-k, where Ink equals asymptotically n - C(F). For any 
other algorithm, p < e "-c~r) (otherwise C(f) could be improved). Thus C(F) 
determines the time needed to "hit" F. A function f, with range other than 
just {m, 0}, can be interpreted as a "price" (e.g., time) needed to establish 
xEF=f-'(~R+). 
Everything is analogous for C(f/y)=-[lnfcla/(tB~=,y ) +f(B(a,y),y))]. 
C. Bennett proposed an interesting electrical interpretation of C(F/y). Let us 
take the circuit of parallelly connected wires, each of which corresponds to a 
particular finite a such that B(a,y)C F. The length and the probability of a 
computation gives the length and the section of the wire. Then C(F/y) is the 
logarithm of the resistance of the circuit. 
A number of search (NP) problems are known, which are easy for 
probabilistic algorithms, but seem hard for deterministic ones; e.g., 
constructing "incompressible" words x, of high Kc(x ), where c is a constant 
and Kc(x) (computable in polynomial time) is the minimal length of p, with 
Kt(x/p) + Kt(p/x)< clog Ix[. The complexity of a search problem R for 
probabilistic algorithms is characterized by C(fJs), where fs(q)= tk~q) if 
R(q) = s, and fs(q ) = oo otherwise. The relationship of this complexity with 
[s[ is a "randomized" version of the P = NP problem. But its relationship 
with the "complexity of obtaining s" looks even more interesting. More 
accurately, how does C({s: ~ > C(fJs) > n}) grow with n, polynomially or 
logarithmically? Short s may exist for which it is very difficult to find 
q C R-X(s), but to find such s may be even more difficult. 
2. Continuous Case 
2.1. Universal Semimeasure 
Now let us extend m to the case of J2. 
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PROPOSITION 3. There exists a largest within a constant factor 
(universal) r.e. semimeasure: ~M V# ~c Vf> 0: #( f )  ~< c.  M(f) .  
Proof. Let (H, <) be an ordered set with a monotone operation 
a: HE~H ("averaging") and a family Y: Nq-*H, containing the smallest 
element 0, closed under a and such that "<, a" are r.e. on the indexes. Let 
the supremums of all directed sets Y(A) with r.e..4 exist and be called the 
r.e. elements. Then (H, Y, <, a) will be called a numbered convex body. 
Note 2. Any numbered convex body (H, Y, <, a) has a universal r.e. 
element, i.e., largest in any weaker than "<"  order "~"  such that x~ 
a(x ,y )>y.  
This element is the supremum of U ag(0), where a0(x)= {x}, ak+l(X ) = 
U{ak(a(r, x)): r E tk}, and t k is the kth enumerable directed subfamily of Y. 
Proposition 3 is a special case, where H = o~/~, a(,u, ~0) -- ~ + q~)/2 and Y is 
the family of "elementary" semimeasures in a natural numeration. An 
elementary semimeasure is the minimal one satisfying a finite set of 
inequalities g ( f )  > r, wherefC J - ' ,  r C @. Q.E.D. 
This M is the central technical concept of the work. Being largest, it 
determines the broadest class of sets .4 c f2 of positive probability. In 
statistics one tries, given a, to get a probability distribution g with respect o 
which a may be reasonably considered "random"; i.e., g(A)>>0 for 
"standard" properties A satisfied by a. But this assertion is the weakest with 
g = M. So M can be taken a priori, before studying what the properties of a 
really are. In other words. If a occurs randomly with probability distribution 
g then it has properties A, for which g(~,4) = 0. The class of such properties 
A is narrowest for g = M, and they can be predicted a priori before finding 
out what g really is. This justifies using M as a priori probability. 
The distribution M is suitable for other applications, as a priori 
probability (e.g., for inductive inference in accordance with the ideas of 
Solomonoff, 1964), but these questions are not considered here. Let us note 
that g (a , )~ M(a,) for any r.e. semimeasure g and g-almost all a. This 
property of a can be used (see Proposition 5) as a definition of the concept 
of a g-random sequence. 
2.2. Randomness and Information; Conservation Laws 
Now the second half of the conventions i very essential. Let us extend to 
.(2 the concept of randomness tests considered in Subsection 1.1. For any set 
A of g-measure 0 there is a lower semicontinuous function t E ~+,  with 
average value g(t)~< 1 and t (A)= {c~}. Only for recursive g, r.e. tests t are 
natural to consider. For a general case let t ° ~ J -  + be the function whose 
subgraph is enumerated by p C ~Q. In Definition 2 we will average this over 
all p generated "arbitrarily," i.e., randomly with universal distribution M. We 
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eliminate the case of /2(t °) > 1 defining t~ =t  ° if /2(t°)<,~ 1, and t~ =0 
otherwise. To deal with random transformations which may turn an 
individual sequence a into a measure ~0, we will extend tests t°~(a) to 
distributions as ~0(t~,). Let (~,) E ~t~ maps p to ¢p(t~,). 
DEFINITION 2. D(~0//2) = [in M(~,)J is the deficiency of randomness of ~0 
with respect o/2. 
Most important is the special case D(a//2) when ~0 is concentrated in a 
single point a. It is a generalization of d(x//2) from Note 1, since its 
"average" is DCu//2) ~< 0. For motivations of the notion of randomness one 
may look in Sections 3 and 1.1. Now the central fact is 
THEOREM 1 (Randomness Conservation). D(AQ21)/AQ22))< D(~ttl/fl2), 
where A C Y is r.e., /21, /22 E ~¢f . 
Proof. Let A'(p) be a sequence, enumerating the subgraph of 
A(t°) C J -+. Then exp D(A~o/A/2)= M(~,)= M(A'(~,))= (M oA')(~,)~ 
t~ M(~,), since M is universal. Q.E.D. 
So, D(a//2) is invariant (within a constant) with respect to all r.e. 
operators preserving/2. 
DEFINITION 3. I(a : f l )=D((a,  fl)/M 2) is called the amount of infor- 
mation in a about fl or the deficiency of their independence. Here a, fl may 
be sequences or semimeasures. 
COROLLARY (A Generalization of Proposition 2). Suppose a, fl E O, 
a C Y .  Then I (A(a) : f l )<I (a  :fl). 
The proof follows by noting that A(M) ~ M and D is monotone. 
This justifies the Independence Postulate, from the Introduction, since one 
can usually "explain" known physical processes reducing them to simpler 
ones in combination with recursive and random transformations (considered 
in the above corollary). The Universe, on the whole, is also assumed to 
evolve according to the (recursive) equations of physics from a state of 
random movement of hot plasma (additional randomness appears in the 
observation processes). Of course, not being a mathematical ssertion (the 
physical world is not chosen mathematically), the Independence Postulate 
(like, e.g., Church's thesis) cannot be proven. 
2.3. Complete Sequences 
Any r.e. measure is recursive, i.e., computable with any accuracy, in 
contrast to semimeasure M for which any r.e. lower bound of 
(maxf(x)) /M(f)  is bounded by a constant. But it may be known about some 
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a C ~ that on its segments M agrees with some r.e. measure it within a 
constant factor. Then, computing/~ gives M(a,) within a constant. Such a is 
called complete, denoted a E C or C(a)<~ 3It sup(M(a,)/~t(a,))< oo. Its 
segments contain all the information eeded to compute their complexity 
- [ln M(a,)~. According to Proposition 4, C is very wide. By virtue of its 
item 2, any sequence a satisfying the Independence Postulate has a 
completion (a, r) E C, satisfying this postulate as well. 
PROPOSITION 4. (1) For any recursive measure ~ and total recursive 
operator A,/~(C) = ~t(S2) and A(C) c C. 
(2) Let fl be a sequence to which a universal r.e. set is Turing 
reducible and a be independent of ft. Then v C N N exists such that (a, v) is 
complete and independent of ft. 
This a comes from (a, r) by a partial recursive (but not total) projection 
operator. So incompletable partial operators can lead out of C. In Section 4 
an axiom is used which means intuitively that every "physical" sequence is a 
projection of a complete one. 
Proof. Let r < 1, 6u(a ) = ln(1 - r) + r In sup(M(a,)/la(a,)) < oo and 
~t'(x) =/~{a: A (a) D x}. Then/~' is also an r.e. measure, and fi,,(A (a)) is a 
/~-test. Then by virtue of PropositionS, fi,,(A(a))< oo and A(a)E  C. 
Obviously ~t(C) = 1 because 6,(a) is a randomness test. 
It remains to prove (2). In Subsection 3.2 of (Zvonkin and Levin, 1970) it 
is shown that M (like any other r.e. semimeasure) is generated by a partial 
recursive operator A from a recursive measure/~: M(x)=/~{a: A(a)~ x}. Let 
A ' (a )= (A(a),vAt~)), where ra(~) is the sequence of values of the time of 
computation of terms of A (a). The operator A' is total and, hence, #'(x) = 
/~{a:A'(a)~x} is a recursive measure. M is generated from #' by the 
projector (a , r )~a.  And _g'{(a,r) : l ( (a,r) : f l )=oo}=O, by Note3. Also 
#'(.O -- C) = 0. Therefore, M{a: Vr E ~(((a, r) ~ C) V I((a, r):fl) = oo)} = 0. 
By Note 3, for any set A such that I~I(A) = 0, a sequence fl' exists on which 
all elements of A depend. The same is true for any sequence to which fl' is 
reducible. Using reducibility to fl of the universal r.e. set, one can routinely 
check that the necessary fl' is computable with respect o ft. Thus fl depends 
on all sequences a not completable for a complete, independent of fl sequence 
(a, r). Q.E.D. 
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II. APPLICATIONS 
3. Foundations of Probability Theory 
3.1. Foundational Difficulties (A Historical Digression) 
Hilbert's sixth problem suggests "To treat in the same manner" (as 
geometry), "by means of axioms, those physical seienees, in which 
mathematics plays an important part; in the first rank are the Theory of 
Probabilities and mechanics." (see Hilbert, 1902). The probability theory is 
considered there as a physical science. But its physical nature was almost 
forgotten after the analytical explosion followed Kolmogorov's book 
(Kolmogorov, 1933), where probability theory obtained a powerful 
mathematical foundation. And some difficulties in the relation of this 
mathematical apparatus to the probabilistic natural phenomena were left 
aside. Kolmogorov noted this in the foreword to the second Russian edition 
(1974) of the book, where he refers to (Kolmogorov, 1965; Zvonkin and 
Levin, 1970) for his new approach. The well-known previous attempts to 
overcome these difficulties by von Mises and Church turned out to be 
imperfect (Ville, 1939). 
The difficulties lie in the gap between intuitive probabilistic ideas and 
those methods which are justifiable theoretically. Probabilistic onsiderations 
start with an assumption that a sequence x is generated randomly with 
probability distribution /l. This /~ is discovered or hypothesized, e.g., by 
analogy with other processes and statistical data about them, considerations 
of symmetry, etc. Then, according to the naive ideas, those properties of x 
are indicated as probabilistic laws whose/~-probability is 1 (approximately, 
in the finite case); e.g., the law of large numbers plays an important role 
when x =xl,. . . ,x . are independent and identically distributed trials (i.e., 
/~(x 1 ..... x,)  =#'(Xl)P'(x2) .. . /t '(x,)). For each set B it predicts x E LLN, 
which means that the frequency of i: x t E B is close to the probability ~t'(B) 
(and #(LLN)~ I). In general, x is predicted to have the properties whose 
probabilities are close to 1. 
The problem is that jointly the properties of probability 1 have probability 
0! One cannot guarantee all of them simultaneously, but should choose one 
or a few. Thus, the outcome should not be expected to withstand statistical 
tests chosen afterwards. So classical theory provides no rigorous basis to 
doubt the honesty of the lottery director whose son won the main prize in ten 
consecutive years, if this is discovered "post factum"! One cannot criticize 
an election when the share of votes for the ruling party in a series of 
consecutive years formed a sequence 0.99k;, even if k i turn out to be the 
decimal digits of n! Of course, one can select few "standard laws" and 
presume them always to be chosen. However, the classical probability theory 
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has no ideas for selection of such standard laws. Besides, this would not 
justify applying probability theory to events preceding such a standar- 
dization (e.g., in cosmology, history, geology, etc.). 
Kolmogorov's idea for solving this paradox is to select hose properties of 
probability close to 1, which are "simply expressible." The objects not 
satisfying such a property form a simple set of small measure and correspon- 
dingly small cardinality. Then any such object is simple itself, being 
specifiable by its number (smaller than the cardinality of the set) with the 
simple description of the set. This allows substitution of many simple 
properties by a single one, "not to be a simple object." Kolmogorov's 
algorithmic information theory was a surprising discovery which provided a 
rigorous basis for the obscure notion of simplicity. In the infinite case the 
corresponding property is "to be random with respect o distribution p." 
Then only this property is expected from the objects occurring randomly 
with distribution p. This property is of p-measure 1 and implies all other 
"good" properties of p-measure 1. Attempts to introduce such universal 
concepts of randomness were undertaken previously (see von Mises and 
Church) for Bernoulli distributions. However, it was found (Ville, 1939)that 
even such standard properties as the law of iterated logarithm do not follow 
from their concept of being a "collective." 
3.2. The Laws of Randomness and Independence 
Any set A is of p-measure 0 iff there is a lower semicontinuous function 
t C J -+,  with average value p(t)~< 1 and t (A)= {~ }. For a typical result a 
of a p-distributed random process, t(a) should not exceed by much the 
average, and the probability of large deviations is small. This justifies the 
following modification of a definition from (Martin-Lof, 1966). 
DEFINITION 4. A randomness test with respect o a recursive measure p
(or a p-test) is a function 6(a) = [in t(a)j, where t E J+  is r.e. and p(t) ~< 1. 
Definition 4 is a formalization of the concept of a "good" law of 
probability theory. The degree 6(a) of deviation from such a law is absolute 
when a fails the test, i.e., O(a)--oo, the probability of which is 0. The 
deviations can be effectively discovered since ~ is r.e. The logarithmic scale 
is chosen for convenience. 
PROPOSITION 5. The following properties of a ~ ~ are equivalent for any 
reeursive measure p and true for p = M: 
(1) D(a/p) < az. (see Definition 2.) 
(2) sup(M(a.)/p(a.)) < ~.  
(3) For any randomness test 3: g(a) < ~.  
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Item (2) means that p on segments of a is not much smaller than the 
a priori probability M (i.e., the assumption that a has occurred randomly 
with probability distribution /~ is at least as consistent with reality as the 
a priori idea about it occurring with distribution M). This property is of 
~t-probability 1 and implies all other effective probabilistic laws. 
Proof. For any recursive measure # and r < 1, it is easy to see that 
r In t + ln(1 - r) is a ~t-test itself, where t = sup{M(an)/#(an) } and thus 
(3 )~(2) .  For any semimeasure /~, (1 )~(3)  since the sequence p 
enumerating the subgraph of exp 6 is r.e. (thus M({p}) > 0) and p(exp 6) ~< 1. 
For /~ = M, (2) is obvious and it remains to prove (2 )~ (1) for any r.e. 
semimeasure/a. Let/a~ be an r.e. family of r.e., with respect o p, normalized 
semimeasures, uch that p~ = t ° •/a if ~t(t p) ~< 1. Let ~(p)  =#~(f) .  Then 
g ' ( f ) - -M(~)  is obviously an r.e. semimeasure and M( f )~p"( f )>/  
exp D((p .f)/p). Let ~Ox(f) = min{f(a): x c a}. Let gx(a) = 1 if x c a, and 0 
otherwise. Since /~ • gx >//a(x). ~Ox, we have M(x)/la(x) ~ exp D(~x/p ) and 
D(a//.t) = sup{D(q~J/~): x c a} < sup{M(an)/la(an) }. Q.E.D. 
Now we are ready to formulate the first of the two distinguished 
probabilistic laws. 
THE LAW OF RANDOMNESS. Let a E/2 be taken randomly with a 
probability distribution p. Then D(a/p) ¢ ~.  
This law was shown to imply all r.e. probabilistic laws. What about the 
other ones? This is interesting for clarifying the relation between the 
algorithmic and classical approaches to probability theory. Let us give an 
important example of nonrecursive laws. 
THE LAW OF INDEPENDENCE. Let fl ~/2  be chosen. A random a C/2 
must be independent of fl, i.e., I(a :fl),~ ~.  
Note 3. The assertions: " f i (A)=0 for all r.e. semimeasures It" and 
"there exists fl, such that I(a : fl) = oo for all a E A" are equivalent for any 
A c /2 ,  as it will follow from Lemma 3. 
3.3. Covering the Classical Formulation of Probability Theory 
The Law of Independence (as well as of Randomness) is violated only 
with probability 0, and thus it is a law of probability theory in the customary 
"classical" sense. This law varies only with the parameter fl, and in its 
formulation (I(a :fl) < ~)  the probability p is not mentioned at all. 
The Independence Postulate in Subsection 0.1 extends this law from the 
usual random processes to any physically realizable ones. This suggests 
bringing this law outside the bounds of probability theory and considering 
other probabilistic laws only for sequences which satisfy the Law of Indepen- 
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dence. This turns out reducing any other probabilistic law (recursive or not) 
to the Law of Randomness. Let I s = {a: I(a :fl) = m }, D r = {a: sup(M(a,)/ 
#(an)) = m } (= {a: D(a/#) = m } for an r.e. #). 
THEOREM 2. Let Ac£2 and /~(A)=0, then such fl exists that 
A c D~UI~,  i.e., any probabilistie law follows from the Laws of 
Randomness and Independence. 
Proof. Since / t (A)=0 and aq~Du=>M(a,)~-#(a,)_, we have 
I~ I (A -Du)=0.  Then there exists r E J  -+ such that M(r )< 09 and 
r(A') = {m}, and Theorem 2 follows from 
LEMMA 3. For each borel rE (~+)a: l~l(r)< m iff f l cO  exists such 
that I(a :fl) )> In r(a). 
"If" follows from Theorem 1 (for A : f l~M®f l )  and item 1 of 
Proposition 5, since for any fl: 
In fi(exp I(a :fl)) ~ D& ® fl/M 2) ~< D(M(fl/M 2) ~< D(fl/M) < oo. 
On the other hand, M( r )<m,  then t iC (Q+)  ~ exists such that 
M(f )  > 1 =>f l ( f* )= 0 (for a natural effective enumeration f~f*  o f~ -+) 
and a=~f l ( i )<  ~,  r<~f . f l ( f * ) .  Let L be the uniform measure on 
[0, a] and, s(p, fl) be the largest integer for which ~{fl(i):i<s(p, fl)} < 
pC [0, a]. Let A(p,f,k) be a sequence enumerating the subgraph of 0, 
where O(a, fl) = ekf(a), if f *  --- s(p, fl), otherwise O(a, fl) = 0. Obviously 
M2(0) % M( f ) .  e k. m(f*/p) and thus, for some constant e, if K(f*/p)>~ 
k+e,  M(f)~<l ,  then (~))(A(p,f ,k))=O(a,  fl). As in Lemmal,  
m((f*,  K(f*/p))/p) ~- e -Kts*/°) and then: exp I(a, fl) = M(~ )) 
Z f(a) .  L {p: s(p, fl) =f*  }. And I(a, fl) >- In •(f(a).  f l(f*)) = r(a), since 
L{p: s(p, fl) =f*}  = fl(f*). Q.E.D.' 
4. Intuitionistic Mathematics 
4.1. A Digression 
The second-order theories (permitting quantification over functions or 
sequences) are much more complicated logically than the first-order ones. 
Some mathematicians (like intuitionists) considered these complications 
dangerous in terms of possible paradoxes. In particular, they assume 
sequences to be formed by sequential "free choices" thus resulting from 
physical (or mental) events rather than from logical definitions. Therefore, 
applicability of usual logical operations to them is not a priori obvious when 
these operations have no physical analogies. For example, classical universal 
quantification assumes the unrealistic ability to scan all conceivable 
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sequences. The hope was to get a less suspicious mathematics restricting the 
logical procedures and postulates to only those closer related with physical 
intuition. 
However, obscurity of notions like "free choice" and of the physical 
intuition makes it difficult to choose formal principles reflecting adequately 
the nature of physically generated sequences. The result is a great variety of 
intuitionistic principles and theories that strengthen, weaken, or contradict 
each other. These theories are often so strong that the relation of their prin- 
ciples to physical intuition stops being obvious. In fact, they are often 
equiconsistent to the corresponding classical theories. On the other hand, 
they are too weak, leaving independent many other principles of intuitionistic 
reasoning. This provides room for creativity in extending these theories, but 
eliminates the hope to get a "canonical" theory with some kind of com- 
pleteness. 
To deal with these difficulties an axiom schema is introduced below 
formalizing the Independence Postulate from the Introduction. The 
intuitionistic second-order arithmetic obtained is equiconsistent to (is a 
conservative xtension of) the classical first-order arithmetic, formulated 
without disjunction and existential quantifier. So its new principles are 
"purely logical," i.e., imply no new facts of classical number theory. On the 
other hand, it is complete, i.e., is a maximal conservative xtension. The 
Independence Postulate brings these "virtues" by excluding sequences with 
unbounded information about the validity of mathematical statements. It is 
natural to attribute the usual troubles of second-order theories to such fancy 
"logical" sequences which, in fact, cannot physically exist. 
4.2. The Preliminary Calculus A 
Our theory AI will be constructed in Section 4.3 by extending the basic 
calculus A, described below. The language of A is second-order a ithmetic. It
contains first-order arithmetic (see Kleene, 1967, Sect. 38), a countable list 
of second-order variables (denoting sequences or functions of natural 
numbers), terms a(t), and formulas YaF and ~aF for all terms t, formulas F, 
and second-order variables a. A formula is called absolute if it does not 
contain 3, V and quantification over second-order variables. Absolute 
formulas have identical meaning and equivalent provability in intuitionistic 
and classical theories. Pairs (and tuples) of integers, sequences, and terms 
are defined the same way as in subsection Notation. Abbreviation s = a(n, ~) 
mean 3k(a(n, k) = s + 1 & (¥k' < k a(n, k') = 0)). 
The postulates of A consist of the ones of first-order arithmetic (see 
Kleene, 1967, p. 387, List of Postulates, Schema 8 taken in the intuitionistic 
version 8') and three second-order postulates: 
Schema of Choice: (gn(~A ~ ~k B(k)))~ 3a ¥n(--~4 ~ B(a(n, j.))) (4.2.1) 
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Markov Principle: (~¥n a(n) = O) =~ 3n a(n) 4= 0 
Axiom of Countability: 3a ¥fl ~k Vn fl(n) = a(k, n, ~ ). 
(4.2.2) 
(4.2.3) 
The axioms of A are not new and need no detailed iscussion. Still in any 
complete (in the sense of Theorem 3) theory these axioms must be provable 
or refutable or equivalent o some undecidable absolute statements of 
number theory. The last two possibilities eem to be less natural. It is known 
that (4.2.1-4.2.3) are inconsistent with the principle of continuity. 
Of course, the calculus A is still too weak. Nevertheless, 
PROPOSITION 6. For any formula F an absolute P exists such that 
A ~-F~Va3f lP .  
Proof Axioms of A allow a construction analogous to Kleene's recursive 
realizability, using the universal sequence a from axiom (4.2.3). Namely, a 
formula Pv(x, a), meaning "a number x realizes a formula F with respect o 
a sequence a" can be defined as in Kleene's "Introduction to 
Metamathematics," Chapter 2, except hat recursiveness of all functions used 
is considered with respect o a. Then any formula F is equivalent o the 
existence of a realization of F with respect to a universal a. It is easy 
(though bulky) to check that A contains all the axioms necessary for 
formalizing these arguments, i.e., the deduction of F,,> Vfl 
3a PF(a(O), (a, fl)). Q.E.D. 
4.3. The Calculus AI; its Relative Consistency and Completeness 
Let P(n) be an absolute formula with a single free variable n. A finite 
binary sequence p is compatible with P (denoted pcP) ,  if Vn ~< l(p): 
(p(n) = 0 ~ P(n)). The abbreviation l(a :P) means sup{I(a :p):p c P}. For 
a given P, the statement I(a : P) ~< e can be easily expressed by an absolute 
formula with free variables a, c. This is used in the following axiom schema 
with a parameter P: 
Independence Postulate: 3c l(a : P) ~ c. (IP) 
The property of completeness (defined in Subsection 2.3) is expressible by 
an absolute formula C(a). The following last axiom of AI asserts implemen- 
tability of completion of sequences mentioned in Proposition 4: 3r C(a, Q. 
The double negations of this axiom and of (IP) would be sufficient for our 
purposes, but the chosen ones are simpler. 
DEFINITION 5. A theory T is called absolute if for every closed formula 
F an absolute (see Subsection 4.2) formula P exists such that T~- -~F¢:. P. 
643/61/1-3 
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Replacing (4.2.3) in A with Church's thesis (CT): ~k Yn: fl(n)= U(k, n, ~ )
(where U is a universal recursive function) one gets the theory of recursive 
realizability of Kleene. It is a known example of an absolute theory. Our 
theory AI is not, of course, absolute, inasmuch as (CT) is independent of it 
and cannot be reduced to an absolute formula. Then to get an absolute 
theory one needs an axiom implying either (CT) or -~(CT). It turns out that 
this is sufficient as well. 
LEMMA 4. For any closed formula F, four absolute formulas P1,P2, 
P3, P4 exist such that these statements are deducible in AI: 
~(P1 V P2 V P3 V P4); P1 ~ ~F;  Pz ~ --~; 
P3 ~ (~F ¢:~ (CT)); P4 => (-~F ¢:> -~(CT)). 
Church's thesis (CT) is a very strong axiom. It excludes any nonrecursive 
sequences, e.g., random ones. The axiom ~(CT) is, inversely, very weak. But, 
unexpectedly, AI + -~(CT) is also absolute: 
THEOREM 3. The absolute closed theorems of AI + ~(CT) are the same 
as ones of the classical first-order arithmetic. No essential (i.e., containing 
new theorems of the form ~F) extension of AI + ~(CT) has this property. 
Thus AI+~(CT)  is a maximal conservative xtension of classical 
arithmetic and is, relatively in a sense, consistent and complete. The basic 
goal of introducing this theory was to study the effects of the axiom schema 
(IP). 
Proof of Theorem 3. We need for each closed formula F to establish a 
corresponding absolute formula ff such that: (ill + -~(CT)) ~- -~F~:> if, and 
if F is absolute itself, then --~ ¢:> ff is deducible in first-order arithmetic. 
Besides, we need to show that all deduction rules and axioms of 
(AI + ~(CT)) will be converted into derivative deduction rules and theorems 
of first-order arithmetic. We shall indicate the transformation -~ into ff and 
explain its meaning without writing out all routine formal deductions. Due to 
Proposition 6 one may restrict himself to formulas of the kind F = Va 
3fl P(a, fl), where P is absolute. We say that F is rejected on 7 @/2 if for any 
recursive function r: N-~ N it is false that for any recursive operator 
k : . (2~,  applicable to 7, P(a, fl) holds, where a=k(7) ,  and f l=k'(7) ,  
k '= r(k). Let /~ be a recursive continuous measure. We will see that the 
equivalence of --~ to the formula "F is rejected for /~-almost all 7" is 
deducible in AI + ~(CT). 
The latter formula can be written in an absolute form and chosen as/7. 
The point is that the quantifier "for almost all 7" in contrast to the quantifier 
"for all 7" is expressible in the first-order language. Obviously the formula 
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"F is rejected on 7," being absolute, can be presented in the form of Vn k 
Ynk_ l~. . .Vno-~(Y ,  no, nl,...,nk), where R is a recursive predicate, 
monotonic on each of the arguments n i (up for the even i and down for the 
odd ones). Let us show by means of recursion, how the predicate 
/f-/{)Y: Vni_  1 ~ Vni_  2 ~ . . .  Vno- -~R( )~ , n o . . .  r ig)  } ~ r is expressed by an absolute 
formula. For i = 0 it is trivial. Now let, at the given i, the predicate be 
expressed in the form of Si(r, n k " '"  h i ) .  Then Vn i Vr' > (1 -- r) 
~Si(r', n~ ... hi) can serve as Si+l(r, n k ... ni+ O. Thus, it remains to show 
that ~F  is equivalent in AI  + ~(CT) to the assertion "F  is rejected for 
/~-almost all 7." 
LEMMA 5. Let ~t and/~' be r.e. measures and/ l  be continuous. Then 
recursive deterministic reciprocal in the domains operators P and P' on I2 
exist defined on/a' (resp. #)-almost all nonrecursive sequences and such that 
U' = P(U). 
The proof of this lemma follows from Theorem 3.1(b) in (Zvonkin and 
Levin, 1970). Since the property "F  is rejected on y" is invariant with respect 
to any recursive reversible transformation of 7, it is sufficient o prove the 
equivalence of -1/7 to "F is rejected for B-almost all ~," where B is the 
uniform measure on {0, 1} ~. By virtue of the same invariance and 0-1 law 
(Kolmogorov, 1933), the set A of all y, on which F is rejected, can be only of 
measure 0 or 1 with respect o B. Hence if R is the set of all recursive 
sequences, the measure of either (.4 A-4~) or (--A ~-~)  equals 0 with 
respect to all other recursive /~ as well. Then by virtue of Theorem 2, a 
sequence xists (and can easily be defined by an absolute formula), upon 
which all complete 7 from this set depend. The axioms of AI  + ~(CT) imply 
that any universal sequence (from axiom 4.2.3) is nonrecursive, quivalent to 
a complete one, and independent of sequences defined by absolute formulas. 
Therefore in the case/~(A) -- 0, F is not rejected on a universal 7 and -~-~F 
holds. In the opposite case @ holds by analogous reasons. These reasonings 
can be easily transformed to formal proofs in AI  + ~(CT). Each of the two 
cases gives implication in one of the directions between @ and "F is 
rejected for/L-almost all 7-" Q.E.D. 
5. Theory of Turing Degrees 
5.1. Independence and Negligible Sets 
A natural field for application of algorithmic information theory is the 
theory of Turing degrees. One may interpret the recursive reducibility of a to 
/? as fl contains all (but a finite amount of) information about a. However, 
the informational concepts are subtler and more elegant than reducibility 
degrees. In particular, they are invariants applicable to finite objects as well 
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(Proposition 2 shows that I(x,y) is left invariant within a constant by any 
recursive reversible transformation of N). 
One of the new possibilities is the informational approach to the concept 
of independence in addition to the concept of reducibility. In terms of 
reducibility degrees one can also say that a and fl are independent if any 
sequence reducible to both of them is trivial (recursive). But a simple 
example shows that this definition does not always agree with the intuition. 
Let a and 7 be random 0, 1 sequences, o.f independent trials, with the 
probability of a n = 0 being ½, and the probability of 7n = 0 being 0.99. Let 
fin = an (~))"n" Then, a and fl are almost always such that only recursive 
sequences are reducible simultaneously to both of them, though 99 % of the 
(random) contents of a and fl coincide (so it is hard to consider them 
independent). 
Many exotic types of Turing degrees are known, e.g., "minimal" degrees 
containing indivisible information (any part of the information of such a 
degree fl, i.e., a degree a < fl, is equivalent to 0 or to fl). The existence of 
such degrees is proven by diagonal methods. Such sequences cannot appear 
in any combination of random and recursive processes (see Rogers, 1967). 
One may hope that many complications of the theory of Turing degrees are 
caused by exotic examples of this kind and the theory of "realistic degrees" 
is simpler. We shall see that this is only partially so. 
Let us use the concept of independence to define the notion of "negligible 
sets" of sequences and study properties of Turing degrees "within this 
negligibility." A set A c ,Q is called inaccessible, if its complement is closed 
with respect o any recursive operator F (i.e., a q~ A =~F(a)~ A). 
PROPOSITION 7. The following properties of  a set A c 12 are equivalent: 
(1) A sequence a E 1-2 exists on which all fl C A are dependent (i.e., 
~a v/~ ~ A: I(a :~)= c~). 
(2) A is a subset of  an inaccessible set, whose any (or some 
continuous) r.e. measure is O. 
(3) M(A)=0.  
Proof. (1)~:~ (3) follows from Note 3. It is obvious that F(M), the image 
of M at an arbitrary recursive mapping F: J? ~ .O, is an r.e. semimeasure and 
hence F(M) ~ M. Therefore, if I~I(A) = 0, then U F -  I(A) = A ~ D A is inac- 
cessible and I~I(A0 = 0. This gives (3)=> (2). Lemma 5 implies equivalence 
of "some" and "any" in (2). Any r.e. semimeasure is the image of a recursive 
measure at a recursive mapping ,Q=~.Q (see Zvonkin and Levin, 1970, 
Sect. 3.2). This gives (2)=~ (3). Q.E.D. 
The sets with any of these three properties are called negligible (this 
neglect is, of course, based on the belief in the Independence Postulate). Two 
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sets A and B are called i-equivalent if their symmetric difference is negligible. 
"A property of Turing degrees" means a Turing-invariant set A cO.  
Studying them to within /-equivalence is simpler, since some properties of 
"exotic" degrees are excluded. The Boolean algebra of Borel sets of Turing 
degrees is denoted by K, and L is its factor algebra with respect o the 
/-equivalence. 
5.2. Types of Turing Degrees 
In Subsection 2.3 the concept of "sequence completeness" was considered. 
The set of incomplete sequences has a property very close to negligibility. 
Namely, (2) in Proposition 7 is obtained from (1) of Proposition 4 by 
omitting the word "total." Thus, incomplete sequences cannot arise in a 
process running in time bounded by a total recursive operator. Let us call 
regular a sequence that is Turing-equivalent to a complete one. It is natural 
to consider properties of the Turing degrees of regular sequences. It turns out 
that only four of them are not equivalent. 
THEOREM 4. 
i-equivalent to: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Any Turing-invariant Borel set of regular sequences is 
the empty set, 
the set of recursive sequences, 
the set of all regular sequences, or 
the set of all regular nonreeursive sequences. 
Thus, the properties of a regular sequence (to within /-negligible sets) 
depend only on its recursiveness, and these sequences form the two most 
natural elements (atoms) of the algebra L. 
Proof As it follows from Lemma 5, any set A of nonrecursive sequences, 
invariant with respect o Turing equivalence, ither is of measure 0 at any 
recursive measure /~, or (for any ~t) contains /l-almost all nonrecursive 
sequences. Then, by virtue of Theorem 2, a fl exists such that all the 
complete nonrecursive sequences either from A, or from the complement of 
A, respectively, depend on ft. And A is /-equivalent to one of the four sets, 
mentioned in Theorem 4, since any invariant set contains either all recursive 
sequences, or none. Q.E.D. 
Other Turing degree types consist of nonregular sequences. It is difficult 
even to prove that their union is not negligible. Nevertheless L contains (see 
V'yugin, 1982; Levin and V'yugin, 1977) an infinitely divisible element and 
a countable number of atoms. Only two of them (namely, (2) and (4) of 
Theorem 4) contain complete sequences. 
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